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W
hat Happened: On April 
1, 2014, at 21:15 UTC, 
all GLONASS satellites 
started to transmit wrong Broadcast 
Messages (BM) as previously 
reported by GPS World (www.gpsworld.
com/glonassgone). The satellite positions 
derived from these BM were wrong 
by up to ± 200 kilometers in each of 
the three coordinates x, y, and z of the 
Earth-fixed, geocentric, equatorial 
coordinate system. The problem 
disappeared after an hour (after two 
erroneous BM) for two GLONASS 
satellites; for other satellites, the 
problem lasted much longer: up to 10 
hours. By about 07:30 UTC on April 2, 
the April Fools’  “joke” was over. 
Effect on GPS/GLONASS Receivers 
Essentially, we can distinguish two 
classes of receivers: those using the 
GLONASS BM for tracking and those 
not using them. The first class of 
receivers “became aware” of problems 
in real time, because GPS and 
GLONASS observations did not result 
in a consistent position estimation. In 
the best case, all affected GLONASS 
observations were flagged (and 
removed from further consideration) 
and the positioning worked properly 
with a reduced number of satellites. In 
the worst case, the receivers stopped 
tracking GPS and GLONASS satellites 
completely. The second class of 
receivers tracked GPS and GLONASS 
normally. The tracking problems 
created a major uproar in the user 
community of combined GPS and 
GLONASS receivers.
On June 3, 2014, at the 13th 
meeting of the U.S. National Space-
based Positioning, Navigation, and 
Timing (PNT) Advisory Board, Gerhard 
Beutler, representing the authors of 
this article, delivered a presentation 
including an example of a permanent 
network of GPS and GLONASS dual-
system receivers in Switzerland and 
neighboring countries, where about 
40 percent of the approximately 
60 receivers stopped tracking both 
GLONASS and GPS satellites. The 
malfunctioning receivers had to be 
reset manually on the morning of April 
2 (for more information, see: www.gps.
gov/governance/ advisory/meetings/2014-06/beutler1.
pdf).
Event as Viewed by the IGS 
At first sight, the GLONASS April 1 and 2 
event was actually a non-event for the 
International GNSS Service (IGS). The 
IGS is a voluntary federation of more 
than 200 worldwide agencies that pool 
resources and data from about 400 
permanent GPS and GLONASS stations 
to generate precise GPS and GLONASS 
products.
The IGS product series, including 
precise GPS and GLONASS 
ephemerides, were generated as 
usual before, during, and after the 
event.  On April 4, a quick analysis by 
Urs Hugentobler revealed that only 
the GLONASS BM were affected; the 
GLONASS code (pseudorange) and 
phase observations and the GLONASS 
satellite clock corrections, were not 
affected. 
FIGURE 1 shows that the GLONASS 
event started simultaneously for all 
satellites (for stationary receivers, the 
first wrong positions were calculated 
for 21:00 UTC, based on the BM with 
Time of Clock (ToC) at 21:15 UTC). The 
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 ▲ FIGURE 1  Affected broadcast messages for each GLONASS satellite. Colors indicate the 
different orbit planes.
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problem was fixed for the first two 
satellites (the GLONASS satellites in 
orbital slots 6 and 23) one hour later; 
the last satellite wasn’t fixed until 07:30 
on April 2 (using the correct BM at 
07:45).
More than about 60 percent of the 
more than 200 combined GPS and 
GLONASS receivers in the IGS network 
tracked the GLONASS satellites 
normally. Fewer than 40 percent of the 
combined-constellation receivers had 
serious data outages (for GLONASS 
or even for both GLONASS and GPS). 
The number of GLONASS observations 
used in the daily work of the IGS 
analysis centers (ACs) was, however, 
only reduced by about 10 percent on 
April 2 (and even to a lesser extent 
on April 1). The small reduction is 
explained by the fact that only the last 
three and the first seven hours of April 
1 and 2, respectively, were affected.
As the IGS ACs do not need the BM 
(neither for GPS nor for GLONASS), but 
may rather use their predicted orbits 
derived from the precise ephemerides 
of the preceding days, the number 
of good observations was still amply 
sufficient to calculate precise GLONASS 
orbits for April 1 and 2, essentially at 
the expected accuracy level.
Detailed Analysis
To further explore the structure of 
the problem, the BM-derived satellite 
positions were used as pseudo-
observations in an orbit determination 
process. Orbit determination was 
successful when analyzing only “good” 
positions (prior to April 1, 21:00 or after 
April 2, 07:30). Orbit determination was 
successful, as well, when using only 
positions from “bad” BM. Successful 
means that the root-mean-square 
(RMS) error of the orbit determination 
process was of the order of about 0.5 
meters per satellite coordinate – the 
expected order of magnitude.
As the bad satellite positions are 
now known to obey the laws of orbital 
motion, one may further investigate 
the nature of the differences between 
the “good” and the “bad” orbital 
positions. For that purpose, the 
precise GLONASS orbits of the IGS 
Center for Orbit Determination in 
Europe Analysis Center served as a 
reference. Its orbital positions were 
compared in the inertial coordinate 
system (one not rotating with the 
Earth) to the erroneous BM-derived 
positions by means of an orthogonal 
transformation, where only the three 
rotation angles around the x-, y-, 
and z-axes of the inertial equatorial 
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coordinate system were estimated.
TABLE 1 shows that the positions 
derived from the normal (“good”) 
GLONASS BM compare very well to the 
IGS precise orbits. Except for a minor 
rotation about the z-axis, one obtains 
zero-rotations about the orthogonal 
axes in the inertial coordinate system.
Table 1 also shows that the “bad” 
positions were obtained from the 
reference positions by a rotation of 
about 0.5 degrees around the inertial 
x-axis. The RMS of 71 meters should 
be compared to the entire effect of 
up to 200 kilometers per coordinate. 
Comparing this RMS of 71 meters with 
the RMS of the orbit determination 
of about 0.5 meters per coordinate 
also says, however, that the “true” 
transformation is more complicated 
than one represented by just a series 
of three rotations.
We did not further investigate how 
this more or less consistent rotation 
could enter into the GLONASS BM. 
It seems to be clear, however, that 
a systematic error slipped into the 
realization of the GLONASS BM, which 
were activated at a common reference 
epoch for all satellites (but uploaded 
to individual satellites at different 
times).
Figure 1 suggests that the problem 
was almost immediately recognized 
by GLONASS operators: already an 
hour later the first two satellites 
started to transmit BM with the usual 
accuracy level.
Figure 1 also supports the idea that 
the problem was remedied satellite-
by-satellite. A back-of-the envelope 
calculation revealed that the satellites 
were above the horizon of at least one 
of the Russian uplink sites at the times 
of switching back to the correct BM.
Summary and Conclusions 
The GLONASS event was one that we 
might have described by the phrase 
“such a thing can never happen.” For 
the user community, the situation was 
aggravated by the fact that the event 
was not reported through the official 
Russian channel by issuing a Notice 
Advisory to GLONASS Users (NAGU). 
This definitely should have happened 
in the interest of transparency.
The above analysis was based on 
information available through the 
IGS. It was performed weeks after the 
event. It is worth noting, however, 
that the information needed for the 
analysis was available in real time. The 
reference orbit used in the analyses 
could have been replaced by the IGS 
predicted orbits generated in the 
ultra-rapid series.
In view of the importance of BM 
for all users and in particular for the 
users of IGS real-time products, the IGS 
might consider monitoring the quality 
of BM for all GNSS.
GLONASS Seen by IGS
continued from page 15
In a May 23 conversation with 
journalists, Javad Ashjaee, president 
of JAVAD GNSS, decried the recent 
controversy about monitoring stations 
on both U.S. and Russian soil, saying 
it was based in misinformation and 
misinterpretations, inflated by a 
political crisis. He also supplied a 
different perspective on the GLONASS 
signal outage than has been reported 
in other media outlets. 
“There was speculation in early 
April that it took GLONASS 11 hours to 
correct a software bug because it took 
that long for all the satellites to pass 
over a control station on Russian soil. 
This was not the case, I have learned 
from conversations with their engineers 
and with the head person responsible 
for all of this. One engineer made a 
mistake and uploaded the wrong 
software. Until they could find it and 
debug it — and it took them 11 hours 
to do so — they could not upload 
correct software to the satellites.
“The 11-hour outage was not due 
to a wait for all satellites to pass over 
ground control stations on Russian 
soil to receive a fresh upload of data,” 
continued Ashjaee. “GLONASS has the 
capability, like GPS, to make updates 
via inter-satellite communication. The 
delay was caused by the time it took to 
find the bug in the erroneous software 
that had been uploaded and correct it.”
Ashjaee addressed the monitoring 
station controversy, saying that Russia 
had sought GLONASS monitoring 
stations in the United States, not for 
uploading any data, but for monitoring 
GLONASS satellites to provide more 
accurate orbit and clock information, 
for the free benefit of all users.
For Ashjaee’s full discussion of 
the U.S.–Russian monitoring station 
controversy, see www.gpsworld.com/glodispute.
For news updates on the situation, 
see www.gpsworld.com/monitornews. 
Fixing the GLONASS Bug: Report from Moscow
 ▲ TABLE 1  Rotation of the entire system of good orbit positions (April 1, 0:00 – 20:45 UTC) with 
respect to precise IGS reference orbits (“good” BM) and rotation of the entire system of bad 
orbit positions (April 1, 21:00 – April 2, 07:00 UTC) with respect to precise IGS reference 
orbits (“bad” BM).
Solution Rot x (arcsec) Rot y (arcsec) Rot z (arcsec) RMS (m)
“good” BM 0.0 0.0 0.4 2
“bad” BM -1763.2 5.3 2.1 71
